Marxism (sort of) and “ethical” vegetarianism

[In what follows, I use “vegetarianism” to refer to veganism or vegetarianism.]

[In #3 in the final “Notes” section, I call the meat industry less “labor-intensive” than other industries. I don’t mean that the work is less difficult or “intense,” but that it employs fewer people. The work is quite taxing, I’m sure.]

Marxism (sort of) and “ethical vegetarianism”

I spent years as a vegan (eating no meat, no dairy, no eggs), motivated by ethical concern for animals. I was particularly militant about this. Like many who share it, I viewed my diet in terms of an informal boycott; I aimed to withhold monetary support from the meat industry, and to that (small) extent impair its ability to torture and kill animals.

I am no longer vegan (nor vegetarian), due in part to the influence of Marxist ideas upon my thinking. At the same time, however, I retain the belief that it is wrong to kill animals for food. (At least, at this stage in human social development, and in the part of the world in which I live.) And I retain this belief for all the reasons I ever held it to begin with.

The difference in my current thinking has to do with the connection between opposing the killing of animals, and being a vegetarian. I don’t think there is much of a connection, in fact. That is, the fact that it is wrong to kill animals does not mean one ought to be a vegetarian. It doesn’t even make vegetarianism a good idea.

Marxism and the moral mushiness of meat

How Marxism relates to this is in its wholesale indictment of production under capitalism. For Marxists and other socialists, how goods are produced—not any particular kind of good, but goods per se—is deeply problematic, always. Without repeating the arguments here, this is due to the kind of relationship direct producers (workers) bear to the owners that pay them to work, and to the fact that production is organized for profit and exchange rather than direct use; these features make the system necessarily undemocratic and exploitative, and contribute to economic crisis and instability, ecological destruction, and even war. These features “cut across” specific sectors and industries within the productive system; they are generic features of capitalist production as such.

In short, such a radical view removes the ability to say: “Believing that a particular industry is fundamentally problematic, one ought to boycott it”—because each industry fits that description, and we can’t boycott them all; we must consume something.

This applies especially to meat since it is not a luxury item which we might simply discard—as we might stop wearing “blood diamonds” or patronizing R-rated movies. For we were getting vital nutrition from that source, and must fill the dietary “hole” left by meat consumption with some other kind of food. And this will come from another deeply problematic industry.

As I discuss below, this does not mean there is no reason, nor even no ethical reason, to not eat meat—only that it removes the moral imperative to do so.

At least, it appears to. Vegetarians might respond that, even if all industries are bad, they aren’t equally bad. Perhaps we are obliged to boycott meat because it is the worst, or a particular reprehensible one.

One argument goes: Killing is worse than (merely) exploiting. So an industry which both exploits human beings and kills animals (i.e., the meat industry) is worse than one which only exploits humans.

But the reality is more complicated. Yes, killing seems worse than exploiting, all things being equal. But things may not be equal. It may not be the case that killing animals is worse than exploiting humans, or, if it sometimes is, that killing just any given number of animals is worse than exploiting just any given number of humans.

Terms for comparison: Not lives, but qualities of life

To clarify the issues at stake, it is helpful to get at what makes killing—any killing—wrong (when it is wrong). What makes killing wrong can only be that “life” has some value which killing destroys.[1] If this is so, we should be able to specify certain features which lend it this value. The obvious candidates are things like autonomy, richness of social relations, capacity for desire satisfaction, etc. These types of thing, or some combination of them, give value to life. And while the list is debatable, it is clear that, by any reasonable measure of what could give value to live, animals will possess some of these features—will have value—just as humans. That is, unless we cheat [2], we cannot construct a list of things possessed by all and only humans but no animals; if humans have value, then animals do.

It should also be clear that these features admit of varying degrees: One can have more or less richness in social relations, more or less autonomy, than another. If this is so, I contend, the animals killed for meat possess these features to a lesser degree than the adult humans exploited in every industry (including meat). Therefore, they have less value, and it is, though still tragic, less so when they are killed.

Two qualifications are in order:

(1) First, this is not a particularly “anti-animal” view. For it is also the case that some humans (say, infants) have less of these features—thus less value—than some animals (just as some animals have less value than other animals, and some humans less than other humans).

(2) Second, I admit the idea of some people being “worth less” than others is extremely distasteful. It would be unfortunate if the concept entered into everyday conversation. But this is not the same as saying the idea is false, or even particularly sinister. It is merely to say that not every being shares (or can share) the same quality of life. The idea does not, in the extreme case, license any kind of Hitlerian “eugenics”: Saying one can destroy a person because they are less valuable than another is like saying I can destroy your car because it is less valuable than mine. There is no principle of logic nor ethics that necessitates that only the absolutely most valuable entity be suffered to exist. The idea that we can “rank” beings according to value does not mean that it is ever right to kill any of them.

But it does complicate the question of whether one capitalist industry is worse than another. It means we are not are dealing with a simple case of “killing versus exploiting.” In comparing meat to other industries, we are comparing worse treatment of “lower valued” beings (animals) to better treatment of “higher valued” beings (adult humans). If human workers have more value than animals, it could be that they have so much more value that merely harming them is actually worse than killing animals.[3]

Other considerations

This still perversely simplifies the moral question. For one, exploitation among human beings is not equivalent across industries, either. There are degrees of intensity of exploitation: Some workers work harder, longer, and for less pay than others. And there are countless moral categories in play here beside just killing and harming in production: From the same Marxist view, the accumulation of capital (productive wealth) is the drive behind all of the system’s problems; as some industries are more profitable, and reinvest (re. accumulate, rather than spend) more profit, than others, they contribute more to this central dynamic. And this occurs after the production cycle rather than in it. Some non-meat industries may accumulate more, may be more volatile and unstable, may contribute more to global trade and the inequities abroad that follow it. All of this would have to be researched and accounted for in deciding the relative “badnesses” of various industries.

Further, there is no “meat industry” as such to be boycotted—not really. The “borders” between industries are mushy rather than firm. Industries buy from one another; aiding one aids the other. If there were no builders, there would be no henhouses, thus no chicken factory-farms. In this sense, the building industry is the chicken industry—and so forth. Buying anything stimulates a general economy which in turn enriches every industry within it. Opting out of meat in particular means more grains will be bought—enriching the same industry which provides cows and chickens and pigs with (the same) grains. The point is not that “everything is bad so we should not boycott anything”—but rather, it is unclear how we might identify and isolate “anything” to boycott it in the first place.

The poverty of “consumer politics” in general

These issues make it difficult if not impossible to establish that the meat industry is worse than any other. A second question is whether, even if it is worse, not eating meat does anything to affect this situation.

It is clear that if I raise an animal to eat, then change my mind and keep her for a companion, an animal is saved. If I quit hunting, that could save animals. But buying (or ceasing to buy) animals on the market is not analogous to this. In a market economy, we don’t normally “order up” live animals to be killed as we need them. There is no such clear, one-to-one correspondence between individual demand and supply. A gross number of animals are killed (or set aside to be killed) prior to and in anticipation of aggregate demand.

Indeed, as high numbers of “demanders” alter their preferences away from meat, this aggregate sum can, after a time, be altered. But this is a case of very broad trends responding to other broad trends. It is likely that a single person’s opting out of meat consumption saves literally not one animal from slaughter. Certainly, it is unclear how this could be proven if it were true.

Note also that overproduction is the norm here. Even if my going vegetarian lowered demand for meat, it is likely that simply fewer animals would be consumed—not fewer killed. Already-slaughtered animals would simply be “wasted.”

At best, not buying meat withholds, over time, a few dollars’ profit from that industry. This is not the stuff of moral imperatives; for a rather silly analogy, if I dropped a few dollars on the sidewalk, and Hitler picked it up to use in his campaign, I could not rationally be especially bothered. I could sleep securely knowing my “contribution” was symbolic rather than substantial.

Conclusion, Part I: The scope of good ideas is not exhausted by the scope of moral imperatives

Again, all of this argues that a moral imperative to vegetarianism does not (clearly) follow from the immorality of killing animals. It is not as straightforward, for instance, as the way in which the imperative not to poke people in the eye follows from the fact that it is wrong to poke people in the eye. Poking eyes is analogous to killing animals—not to buying meat from animals already killed.

But there are plenty of worthy projects—indeed, the vast uncountable majority of life’s projects—that aren’t imperatives. A thing needn’t be morally obligatory to be a perfectly good or helpful thing to do.

Two appealing “alternate” motivations for vegetarianism come to mind:

(1) Eating meat strikes me as a distasteful, ugly practice, and could be avoided on these “aesthetic” grounds alone. The same kind of reason would keep any parent from tearing a photograph of their children—though no actual children would be harmed in doing so.

(2) Given the wrongness of killing animals, refusing to eat them is a way to feel connected to them, to the whole world of sentient, morally deserving beings of which anyone reading this is a part. We needn’t be obliged to seek this feeling, but it is a healthy, desirable goal. It helps us whether it helps any animals—and we are important, too.

Conclusion, Part II: Consumer politics redux

Finally, what small practical or psychological benefit comes about from “ethical” vegetarianism must be balanced against the harm it could cause. Again, I’m speaking here as a Marxist—a socialist activist—and to others on the radical left for whom vegetarianism is appealing.

The chief political rival to revolutionary socialism is reformism—the idea that socialism, or at least a benign, democratic, peaceful, equitable world, can be generated by a gradual accumulation of small improvements to capitalism. And the most vulgar species of reformism is the notion that the, or a significant, way to bring about political or economic changes is through selective purchasing.

This view is not only false but dangerously misleading. I suspect that vegetarianism—being a particularly common and “visible” expression of consumer politics—confuses the hell out of the average worker or student who might be ripe for radical politics. It “sends a message” that not buying stuff is the way to get things done, the “natural,” proper expression of one’s opposition to social problems.

I can’t prove this, but I suspect it. If true, this confusion can only hinder the real activism that needs to be done—raising enough hell to scare the state into making concessions. If there were strong reasons to boycott meat in the first place, this might outweigh the potential “damage”; but, again, there aren’t.

Notes

[1] Here I am ignoring the possibility that beings have “rights” which make it wrong to kill them. No evidence has ever been adduced that such a thing as natural rights exist, and even if they do, that doesn’t negate my alternative analysis. “Rights” could theoretically exist right alongside those “features” which give life its value. Either or both could make it wrong to kill at the same time. It could be wrong to kill you because it violates your rights and because it destroys your value.

[2] Speciesists might say that “being human” is what gives value to life—to which we might reply, What is it about being human that gives life its value? What do humans possess that gives human life this value? It is circular reasoning to answer again: “The feature of being human.” Eventually, we have to get back to non-species-specific features.

[3] Note also that the meat industry is less labor-intensive than many other industries, so there are far more humans exploited in the latter than in the former. This increases the likelihood that meat production is not particularly bad. Consider: If there were an equal number of humans working in the meat industry as in any other industry, this would amount to a moral “wash”; as far as humans are concerned, at least, none would be worse than any other. So any industry which killed animals on top of this would indeed be the worse. But other industries have so many more humans than in meat production that only a small percentage are “washed out” in the comparison. We are not simply dealing with “higher value” beings harmed versus “lower value” beings killed—but rather a significant number of “higher value” beings harmed versus “lower value” killed.

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19 responses to “Marxism (sort of) and “ethical” vegetarianism

  1. Very interesting post. I would take issue with one argument though: “It is likely that a single person’s opting out of meat consumption saves literally not one animal from slaughter.” While this is surely true, I don’t know if it’s relevant. You can say the same about voting. The probability that your vote will change the result of the election is effectively zero so why bother? I can see the logic of your argument, but I can see the same logic for the case of voting which suggests a problem in the logic (to me). I don’t have a wholly satisfactory resolution to this problem. I suspect a resolution requires one to think beyond the likely effects of ones own actions and consider the effect of other people acting similarly, but I don’t want to go the whole hog and suggest an ethical system based on Kant’s categorical imperative.

  2. Pingback: Ethical vegetarianism « The Samovar

  3. “Yes, killing seems worse than exploiting, all things being equal. But things may not be equal. It may not be the case that killing animals is worse than exploiting humans, or, if it sometimes is, that killing just any given number of animals is worse than exploiting just any given number of humans.”

    that’s an awfully shaky premise to base an entire philosophy around. luckily vegans don’t have to worry quite as much about all those ifs or maybes. worker exploitation is variable in both the meat industry or the plant agriculture industry. i’m not denying that it happens in both places, but with the meat industry, animal exploitation is a definitely constant.

    also it’s only anecdotal, but i’m not vegan because of radical politics. in fact most of the vegans i know aren’t vegan because of radical politics. i’m vegan because animals have the capacity to feel pain.

  4. Dan/thesamovar (2 posts up),
    I agree with or am otherwise sympathetic to 100% of what you say here. I share your reservations about the logic in question, and I don’t have a satisfactory answer to those reservations either. And the analogy to voting seems sound.

    I can only respond:

    (a) To repeat, the absence of a mandate doesn’t mean we shouldn’t “bother.” On par with my comments on vegetarianism, I think the reason we should vote is less to “make a difference” in the outcome but to solidarize with the hopes of like voters and to experience the inherent good of civic participation. And there is a categorical difference between opting out of meat and voting–my not eating meat won’t save any animals, while my voting could change the outcome. (It isn’t likely, but its possible, and has happened before.) Maybe this possibility “mandates” voting after all, while no similar stake mandates vegetarianism.

    (b) I have to press the other points in the essay, which could still be sound if the previous “logic” isn’t: (i) Not eating meat may not represent a net ethical outcome, given that (a) it requires consuming more from a possibly equally bad or worse industry, and (b) the possible drag on political activism that comes about from promoting a confusing consumer politics. (iii) Also, it isn’t clear that there is a “meat industry” to boycott, given the incestuousness of the market. It isn’t clear how to boycott meat even if we are “mandated” to do so.

    Thanks for reading/responding and I like your blog, which the readers should check here.

  5. Vegantofu*ker,

    Yes, it is “a shaky premise to build a philosophy around.” That is precisely why I haven’t built a philosophy–namely, of vegan/vegetarianism–around it. The apparent moral incommensurability of the various industries makes any imperative to boycott any one of them indeed “shaky.” That’s kind of my point. The imperative to boycott is a theoretical burden which those who levy it must bear. It is they who must be “unshaky,” not me. I’m not “saying” anything, really, with the statement you quote. Just critiquing what has been said. (So to speak.)

    I’m not trying to be snarky. I appreciate the thoughtful response.

    p.s. Your co-postpunkkitchener is wrong about more than umbrellas.

  6. just one more thing to add. it is true, vegans do not save animals in the literal sense (by their dietary choices). in the same way, “not killing people” does not save lives either. however this does not make “not killing people” a meaningless thing to do.

    one of the things veganism does is reduce the demand for animal products so that less cows and chickens and fish are born into a lifetime of misery. it’s not saving lives, it’s preventing deaths.

    your being noncommittal in choosing what to support has caused you to default to meat eating. but that’s not a neutral position. you’ve clearly made a choice – animal exploitation.

  7. tskuta of the ppk

    I think the value of the dollars you gave to Hitler and the value of your vote are roughly similar… but I have no figures so nevermind.

    But, I’m wondering why you’re using a ‘Marxist’ framework for this. Marxism alone is insufficient to deal with a problem as complex as a society – most philosophies are; they leave you stranded, stuck in the idea of the system(s) without any access to the material reality of those systems. Like you, you are stymied by the idea that this is pointless without an all-out revolution: sudden switch from the frameworks of power as they stand into something more egalitarian, a system that you don’t even find worthwhile enough to try now. I don’t understand the practice of vaunting the ideal when you don’t practice the material form of that ideal. Especially when even miming that form is a type of activism. Sure, “raising hell” is good, but how do you get other people to do it with you, how do you convince them that the future you’re preaching is any better than the one they have now, how do you convince the that it is even POSSIBLE to survive such a system when contemporary discourse claims to present evidence to the contrary (misleading of course). Practicing ethical vegans influence other people, bending the discourse of possibility away from exploitative forms of industry. The imperative lies in the material, nothing will change unless people can be made to understood that it can change. Vegans are a material force; they are material evidence against the discourse of current powers and people understand the material, not the philosopical.

    Just as you said, the network of industry and capital are one evil cluster-fu#k of exploitation; but, you should consider that liberation has the same essential cluster-fu#kness. If you find it imperative not to exploit people, you must then find it imperative to buck the stsem, you must then find it imperative to change the will of the people; you must then find it imperative to show the possibility of the future; you must then be vegan.

  8. amerikanbeat said: “This applies especially to meat since it is not a luxury item which we might simply discard—as we might stop wearing “blood diamonds” or patronizing R-rated movies. For we were getting vital nutrition from that source, and must fill the dietary “hole” left by meat consumption with some other kind of food. And this will come from another deeply problematic industry.”

    Although I’ve been a vegetarian since childhood for many reasons, the main one being I have no innate desire to consume flesh, I do not oppose others eating meat; the thing that most disturbs me is industrial farming practices. In reference to filling the “nutritional” void, I don’t think it has to come from another deeply problematic industry – in fact, food doesn’t have to come from an industry at all.
    What about supporting those small, non-industrial farms with sound practices that are cropping up all over? I get a lot of my food (for a good price, I might add) from a small, family-run CSA that seeks to rehabilitate farmland once used for tobacco (another industry not worth supporting). I see many people becoming interested in such arrangements, providing meaningful work for the families that farm, lessening the impact on the environment (fewer food miles, pesticides, etc.), and do believe the collective effort can reduce the demand for industrially supplied meat and vegetables. Many of these farms raise animals for food as well, for those who do choose to consume meat from a source that at least gives the animals a better life before slaughter.
    How about growing your own, or buying from your local farmer’s market? I think the main issue is the distance created by industry between us and the source our food (some of it doesn’t even qualify as food anymore), whether meat, vegetable, or frankenfood. I believe this is the same issue as the Marxist idea that the worker has been distanced from the meaning of his work.
    From my point of view, it isn’t about choosing between two industries. It’s about choosing non-industry (or at least lessening the need for it). There’s nothing more satisfying than walking outside to pick a fresh tomato that you grew yourself, or picking up a basket of real food that allows both another family and your own body to thrive, often at a lower cost to environment and purse.

  9. tskuta of the ppk:

    I know there’s more to your comment, but for now: I’m not taking a whole “framework” from Marxism here, just maybe some inspiration. Marxism suggests that industry as such is problematic. That’s about all the essay owes it. I use this point to suggest that more theoretical work is to be done if any one industry (like meat) is to be singled out. And I qualify this in various ways and draw some tentative conclusions, none of which are especially “Marxist.” (Hence the “sort of” in the title.) I mean, you can certainly use Marxism to refute me–you can use anything you like, if it works. But there is no contradiction there. I can’t be accused of misreading Marx to draw poor conclusions because I haven’t really “read” him on this in the first place to “mis[s].” It isn’t an especially Marxist analysis.

  10. Tskuta of the ppk

    amerikanbeat:

    I never accuse you of misreading Marx.

    However, I am accusing you now of misreading what I wrote and misrepresenting it.

    I would really love to clarify for you, but your response is so off-base that it would just be better for you to re-read my first comment. Please, mind my punctuation; that seems to be what you’re missing.

  11. tskuta:

    Yes, I misread your comment in my haste. I apologize for this. I don’t like it when people do it to me. But it wasn’t an attempt to straw-man or deliberately “misrepresent” you; my first interpretation left your argument looking better, actually (in my view).

    Please understand my error: Your whole “philosophies…leave you stranded…[you gotta] practice the material form” of the ideal, etc. sounds very, very “Marxy”–right??–so I thought you were presenting it as your own version of a *proper* Marxist approach to these sorts of issues, counterposing it as a corrective Marxist reading to my own (alleged) “mis-reading” of Marx. Oddly, on your suggested reread, I see you intend that really Marxy-sounding stuff as a kind of alternative (!) to Marxism and “philosophies” altogether.

    My confusion was only borne of honest charity. I’d not considered that you might be presenting an entrenched, elementary point of Marxist epistemology as a refutation of Marxism.

    So to revise my first response: Keep the part (the first part; the main part) where I say “I wasn’t using a Marxist ‘framework’ for this like you say” but chuck the part where I say “you accuse me of misreading this (alleged) framework.”

    Anyway, I’ll hit your specific points later.

  12. Hi again,

    “I think the reason we should vote is less to “make a difference” in the outcome but to solidarize with the hopes of like voters and to experience the inherent good of civic participation.”

    I don’t really buy this for voting (although obviously I still don’t have a better explanation).

    “And there is a categorical difference between opting out of meat and voting–my not eating meat won’t save any animals, while my voting could change the outcome.”

    I’m not so sure, I think the case of voting is like the case of meat eaters as you described it: “Indeed, as high numbers of “demanders” alter their preferences away from meat, this aggregate sum can, after a time, be altered. But this is a case of very broad trends responding to other broad trends. There is no such clear, one-to-one correspondence between individual demand and supply. A gross number of animals are killed (or set aside to be killed) prior to and in anticipation of aggregate demand.” There is a very, very small chance that your vote will be a crucial one (tiny in fact, given that the margin of error in the count is quite high), but if you and many other like minded individuals change your voting preference en masse then that’s a broad trend. It’s even more like it if you consider the way that political parties change their policies over time to respond to trends in voter preferences as they perceive them.

    I agree with your points in (b) though, it was just this particular thing about voting that I wanted to comment on. And thanks for the comment about my blog (which I reciprocate!), I haven’t had an awful lot of time to write anything interesting on it recently, but there was some good stuff a while ago.

  13. dan/thesamovar:

    I gotcha. I’m in total agreement here. The stuff you pick out isn’t the strongest of mine. But there is some impulse to be “systematic.” That stuff tries to answer questions raised by the other, seemingly stronger points. Again, thanks for responding.

  14. Meat is a demerit good though?

    The production of it consumes one third of all agriculture produced in the world, etc etc I’m sure you know this…

    It’s environmental impact is far greater than all transport combined etc…

    Surely in the struggle to create a fairer more equal society, many countries are left with food shortages because of this industry and its workings.

    I would of thought that if you were a strong enough marxist to reject all vegan moral principles, you may be a strong enough marxist to perhaps see other life, such as animal life as being equal to an extent.

    We need a society that protects the weak… ranging from those with disabilities, children, babies and animals.

    The food industry is incredibly inefficient and as a result, the market failure is one which is detrimental to the weak, so i would argue that this is basically capitalistic, whereby the consumer chooses… the higher classes who can afford to choose.

  15. Failed vegan trying to defend eating meat and completely failing. Go munch on some dead animals and pretend Karl’s got your back. Worse than capitalist swine is a capitalist eating swine.

  16. I second the comment above.
    Man, I haven’t read such BS for a LONG time.

    The assumption that there is only one person changing his diet and therefore not make a difference is ridiculous. There are tons of people that become vegetarian/vegan every day. You just convinced many of them to give it up.

    Why don’t you asses the harm that you caused with your article, genius.

  17. amerikanbeat

    You are so lame,
    I don’t think you read this carefully. I did say it was unlikely that one person’s being a vegan/vegetarian made a difference vis-a-vis killing animals. But I never denied there are many more than one vegetarian; nor did I deny they could make this kind of difference together. (I explicitly and unambiguously said the opposite–re. the part about “broad trends.”). I did say (a) this fact that one person’s being a vegetarian/vegan doesn’t make this difference removes the moral *imperative* to be vegan/vegetarian; and that (b) the difference that many vegans/vegetarians can make together is not a *net* difference in moral terms. OK?

  18. Marxist Hypocrisy 101

    Vegans are uninformed, hypocritical idiots, and it’s asinine to let sonmebody devoted to a genocidal and anachronistic form of feudalist collectivist-totalitarianism like Marxism dictate your morality for you.

    Though it is amusing watching the vegs and marxists turn on each other here like the senseless animals you are, considering at the end of the day you’re all the same sort of propaganda-spouting, authoritarian shitbags.

  19. @Marxist Hipocrisy 101

    Let me paraphrase your position here: You don’t like veganism nor Marxism.

    Fine; you’ve declared this. Can you argue for it? Interesting putting the “101” in the title–suggesting a lesson is to follow. But all we learn here is the contents of your mind. Nothing like *reasons* accompany. So I don’t know what to do with this. It’s interesting that you have these feelings on the matter, I guess. Thanks for telling me, I guess. But I’d love to hear something like a case made as to why these feelings have general merit. That is, why I (or anyone else but you) should give a shit.

    [But I bet it won’t be good. (a) “Collectivist totalitarianism”? I don’t think there could be such a thing. (Maybe that’s your point–given the above, I have to speculate; but I bet you’re just saying such a thing would be bad.) If it’s collective, who’s doing the “totalitarianising”–and over who else? And if they are, doesn’t this mark a social division incompatible with what everyone has ever meant by “collectivism”? (b) Vegs and Marxists “turning on each other”? This implies there is, or was, come mutual affinity between the two. (You wouldn’t say that cops and thieves “turned on each other.”) I don’t get where you get this from.]

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