Category Archives: electoral strategy

Tim Wise on Obama’s “victory over white supremacy,” part I: Or, The difference between an index and a prospect

Seriously, my biggest fear with Obama’s presidency is that it will make radicals stupid. This is already evident in the tendency of some leftists to hyper-inflate the political significance of his “blackness.”

Tim Wise is a writer and activist who is dead-on about the persistence and ubiquity of white privilege. As a speaker, he is smart, aggressive, witty, and immensely competent. I’ve gotten chills watching videos of his debates. I’ve linked him favorably on this blog before.

However, his latest essay is a particularly vulgar example of this “stupidity.” Its the absolute worst thing he has ever written. (It may be the only very bad thing he has written.) He attacks “barbituate leftists”—“downers” who are so wedded to the “revolution” that they pooh-pooh any signs of progress short of the full program. So far as I can tell—and I’m from the same city as Wise—these guys either don’t exist or are too marginal to warrant serious address.

Don't harsh this guy's mellow, dude

Don't harsh this guy's mellow, dude

In Wise’s view, radicals have failed to appreciate how Obama’s win is “a victory over white supremacy.” At the root of this failure is “left cynicism”—the idea among radicals that Obama is just “the same” as Republican politicians and thus that his win represents nothing good.

As Lou Proyect points out [and nods to him for the Wise link], American elections actually presuppose—they require—that Democrats and Republicans not be “all the same.” And this, indeed, is part of the problem: As I’ve written before, Democrats can so assuredly count on “lesser evil” votes from their “core historical constituencies” of women, minorities, labor, and the poor, that they don’t have to be but a step to the left of (indeed, merely “less evil” than) their rivals. And they don’t have to offer their “core” anything; they only have to deal with the white, male, wealthy voters who are actually up for grabs. This moves the whole spectrum of political thought—what counts as left and what counts as right—a bit further to the right every single election. (If both parties were “the same,” this might be better. There wouldn’t be this internal regressive dynamic; the spectrum could just “hold” rather than slide right-ward.)

The thing is, Wise never defines just how Obama is a “victory over” white racism. At most he notes there is a “significance in the election of a man of color in a nation founded on white supremacy.” And indeed, this is true. Obama would not have been elected when black people were being murdered for looking whites in the eye or reading books without pictures. Nor would a black man have been elected just eight years ago, as some polling data [1] suggests.

But this describes not so much a “victory over” anything as it is an index or representation of victories already gained. And let me stress that this does not make it “nothing”; the “significance in the election of a man of color in a nation founded on white supremacy” is real, positive, and nothing to be “cynical” about. This was indeed my first thought on hearing the election results. And, contra Wise, I haven’t encountered a single leftist who would say otherwise.

But we still have to call things by their proper names. An index is not the same as a prospect. The fact that Obama represents progress on race doesn’t mean his tenure won’t still be a net loss for black people (and white workers, and the world, for that matter)—any more than a wedding, as an index of a couple’s love, means they will actually have a good life together.

And really, the prospect is the important thing here, right? At least, it is far, far more important than anything Obama “represents.” Wise seems to agree: He objects to radicals’ “lecturing the rest of us about how naïve we are for having any confidence whatsoever in [a President Obama]” (i.e., confidence in the prospect that he will do good things on the racial front). But he never bothers to argue why such a confidence is warranted. At most, he cites the “millions of people who…are mobilized and active,” whose “[political] energy is looking for an outlet.” Ostensibly he means that this energy can be harnessed for progressive political ends. Fine, perhaps we should “hav[e] confidence” in them. But what does this have to do with “confidence in Obama” himself?

(Maybe Wise hopes Obama will be progressive. Well, so do I. I hoped Bush would be, too; I hope the Iraq occupation goes well; I hope the Klan starts serving inner-city children breakfast. I hope golden coins fall out of my cat’s ass. But I have no “confidence” in any of it.)


The point (index versus prospect) is a logical one: A, quite simply, is not B. But beyond this, we have good reason to be, if not “cynical,” at least reticent about B—that is, about the prospect that Pres. Obama will further the fight against “white supremacy.” I argue for this specifically in my next post.

But for now:

(a) If I’m right—if Obama looks to be a bust for black people—there is no contradiction in stating this fact while celebrating the positive things his election “represents.” Indeed, if so,

(b) We should focus on that fact, because it affects the kind of strategy we who are concerned with black liberation and “progress” should follow.

In the end, Wise’s lament against political “downers” has no teeth on its own. When “downing” is applied to a deserving target, it simply amounts to telling the truth. It is only wrong to deny “confidence” in Obama IF he has given us a reason to have confidence in him. (Nobody would tell the doctor, “Come now: First the cancer diagnosis, now diabetes? Stop being such a downer!” If they do have cancer and diabetes, “downing” is just what they need.)

So Mr. Wise: Do the work; make the case. If we should have “confidence” in Obama’s willingness to fight “white supremacy,” give us the evidence, as you would (and do) with any other truth-claim.

Again, I present my own evidence to the contrary in the next post.


[1] Richard Wolffe and Darren Briscoe, “Across the Divide: Barack Obama’s Road to Racial Reconstruction,” Newsweek (July 16, 2007). 2007 Poll shows 59% of respondents agree the U.S. is “ready to elect a black President”; only 37% said so in 2000.


An argument sketch on not falling for another Democrat, again

God I’m sick of this Obama shit.

An argument sketch, to be followed by a lengthier article:

The “power base” of a presidential candidate—what moves him and makes him, fundamentally—is not any segment of the electorate but the monied interests that have to be satisfied long before a candidate gets to the electorate. This is why businesses donate to both parties at once. This base effects a natural rightward pull on the candidate which will be effective unless a suitable political “counterweight” is applied. It explains why every single presidency since the Sixties has been a step to the right of the presidency before it. Obama will not and cannot buck the trend no matter how much he would love to and no matter what he says (which isn’t all that good, by the way). Good and benign presidential behavior is not correlated with good and benign intentions in the minds of presidents; it is correlated with that “counterweight” to the rightward drift—namely, robust progressive social movements. And we don’t have any. (We had the beginnings of an anti-war movement which pissed itself away getting behind the drive to elect Kerry. Learn from this.) This basic fact made a Nazi like Richard Nixon our last truly progressive president—far more progressive than Clinton ever dared in his private heart of hearts to be.

And voting for Democrats actually hurts the progressive cause: Not only does it hinder social movements on various levels (more on this later), but it teaches the Democrats that they don’t have to be but a “step to the left” of the Republicans. When Democrats can rest easy in their support from progressives (women, minorities, labor, the poor, my friends on myspace), they don’t have to concede anything to them. They only have to make concessions to the conservative (male, white, middle class) voters who they can’t take for granted. This has gradually shifted the whole scope of political discourse in the US—what counts as left and what counts as right—to the right. This makes it harder for presidents and those social movements alike to get anything “good” done.

On the strangeness of formal democracy: Elections as overrated (Part I)

Preliminary Considerations 

In the Western liberal conviction, the best litmus test for the presence of democracy—that is, for whether people are empowered—is elections; often enough the two are just equated. This abstraction of the voting exercise from other social and political factors is unfortunate and, at bottom, puzzling: For it should be obvious that, (a) in the absence of certain conditions, elections do not mean very much: Even slaves could elect their masters, or the illiterate “select” by random punching of buttons. More plausibly, it is possible that an electorate is so busy, or preoccupied, or ignorant, that it cannot appreciate it’s options, or what is at stake between them—or to have such poor options that nothing much is at stake. In representative democracy, there may be lacking a real and clear mechanism for translating a candidate’s pre-election positions into action in office.

Further, it is almost true to say that (b) to the extent that the conditions which lend meaning to an election are met, the elections themselves become superfluous. That is, an electorate must already be substantially empowered for elections to be (further) empowering. In the case of electing political representatives—which all but exhaust elections in Western democracies—the point is especially clear: Because actually making decisions, practicing real self-determination, is needed to understand how anyone else could do it on your behalf, much less who could do it best. Conversely, if the electorate is not already substantially empowered politically, the ballot is unlikely to make it so: Intuitively, a system will not permit serious changes to itself by electoral means unless some extra-electoral force compels this. Slaves will never be able to vote for their freedom unless they are powerful enough to force such a thing through—in which case they are well on their way to freedom with or without the vote. There is no reason why the same relationship (between the vote and extraneous factors) should not hold for less extreme cases.

Why “Free Choice” Cannot be the Mark of An Empowered Society

The strangeness of the electoral standard goes deeper. Consider: An electing body by definition has choices, but does not “choose its choices” ad infinitum; that is, at some point it is forced to choose from among a set of choices which itself it has not chosen. This set is, as it were, imposed upon it. But, recalling the liberal ethos, if it would be dreadful to have any one of the choices in the set simply imposed “undemocratically” upon an electorate, it should be almost as dreadful, it seems, that the whole set be imposed in the first place. In this way, every choice swims about in a sea of impositions; impositions are precisely what make the choice possible. And most other phenomena is much further removed from any human choice: On a consistent liberal view, clearly “bad” things like earthquakes and fatigue become all the worse for being unchosen; and even clearly “good” things like sunshine become regrettable for being unchosen—just as liberals lament an even very good and benign, but unelected, national leader. If “choosing” is to remain the touchstone of an empowered society, not only do elections become self-defeating but life in its inescapable, irremediable “givenness,” fraught with new regrets at every turn.

To answer that the only impositions which count are those that come from people, versus bare circumstances, is not only arbitrary—like saying you can only be wet when someone throws water on you—but also overlooks the degree to which people also “make” the political system which facilitates or frustrates certain electoral options from emerging to table, and could change it if they wished. The confusion is removed (only) if we assess the degree to which a populace is empowered in the same way we really assess “givens” like sunshine and earthquakes: We ask whether the choices it faces, and makes, are in fact empowering ones—apart from the fact they are chosen—and whether the impositions it (inevitably) undergoes are in fact empowering, apart from the fact they are not chosen.

[Part II to follow.]

Ron Paul: Not antiwar, not progressive (Not that it should matter if he were)

That Ron Paul’s campaign has emerged as a “progressive” option does not change the fact that the man, from a progressive view, has mostly reprehensible positions, and reprehensible (or incoherent, or tepid) reasons for holding his ostensibly un-reprehensible positions. Nor are these irrelevant.


Ron Paul’s Flaky Antiwar Credentials:

The Votes on Iraq and “Afghanistan”

Not that Ron Paul is “antiwar” in any sense of the phrase activists should find interesting. Certainly, such a stance is not deducible from his congressional record.

Paul’s “Statement Opposing the use of Military Force against Iraq” complains that the vote ceded warmaking powers to the President rather than, properly, to Congress. This reflects that goofy, crude Constitutional fetishism of Paul’s which quibbles over where the “proper authority” for engaging some action technically rests rather than whether whatever is being authorized is actually a good idea. An “antiwar” legislator would oppose ceding warmaking authority to Bush not because it violates some point-of-order clause, but because, damn it, the guy might use it to start a war.

Paul also objects that the Iraq campaign was begun with no clear definition of what it would mean to win it. This reasoning is sympathetic and one can only wish Paul could be counted on to apply it. His antiwar supporters don’t much talk about his 2001 vote to authorize “Military Force Against [the 9/11] Terrorists” in what would become the War in Afghanistan. Like the Iraq resolution, this vote both ceded authority to the President to use “all necessary force”—against whomever he determines, at any later date, committed the 9/11 attacks or gave any kind of aid to those who did—and does not specify what it would mean to win such a campaign. Indeed, how could it?—as it names no targets nor the means to be used to target them. It does not even assume the President had yet made up his mind about who the enemy would be.

Paul regrets, “I voted for the authorization and…the funding, and yet it was completely misused…I was deceived…I didn’t vote to occupy and nation-build.” Paul speaks as though the vagueness of the resolution—that it never says the words “occupation” or “nation-build[ing]” or “regime change” or “war” as opposed to the swift and modest and localized police action he supposedly preferred—is somehow a defense for his voting for it. But its vagueness and wide-open applicability is precisely the problem. It could have been used to start a war or an occupation just because it says nothing to rule out those types of “military force.” You can’t “misuse” something whose use is never specified.

Unlike Paul, Rep. Barbara Lee had the sense and valor to vote against this resolution. Her defense of this decision reads just like (the better sections of) Paul’s 2006 Iraq “Statement”: “…I could not ignore that [the authorization] provided explicit authority, under the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution, to go to war…It was a blank check to the president to attack anyone involved in the Sept. 11 events—anywhere, in any country, without regard to our nation’s long-term foreign policy, economic and national security interests, and without time limit. In granting these overly broad powers, the Congress failed its responsibility to understand the dimensions of its declaration.”

This is precisely the thing Paul says he opposes in foreign policy, and he voted for it anyhow. Thus, if we believe him that his reasons for voting “No” in 2003 reflect long-standing principles, we must conclude that these are so flexible as to divest the word “principle” of all its normal meaning. (It isn’t as though his record is loyal to the rest of his stated values: His anti-tax, small government, free competition plank is belied by his heavy support for the same pork-barrel spending and corporate subsidies every other politician goes in for—including a weird coziness with the shrimp industry.)

Worse, by the time of Paul’s 2001 vote there was already so much evidence that Bush wanted the vote to “invade” and “occupy” Afghanistan (for starters) that blindness to this could only be willful. Within 24 hours of the 9/11 attacks, Bush had fingered the Taliban regime as a terrorist “harborer” and recalled the American ambassadors and UN delegates from Afghanistan. Paul knew Iraq had been the administration’s leading official “terrorist state” and held a policy of “regime change” against it, as well as against all the other top official terror sponsors. In fact, Paul believed what the U.S. was already doing to this “terror state” via the no-fly zones was an “occupation.” How, then, might he have been unaware that an “occupation” and “regime change” was off the agenda for “terrorist” Afghanistan? Add to this that Paul had by now heard Bush promise “a long [military] campaign, a determined campaign in a lot of countries.” (He would soon define “a lot” as “more than sixty.”) Secretary of State Powell had reiterated that the war “isn’t going to be solved with a single counter-attack against one individual, it’s going to be a long term conflict.” Bush’s use of mushy “War on Terror” phrasing only underscored this open-ended aspect.

Other Considerations

Ron Paul’s foreign policy is always fundamentally informed by his America First-ism, with all the moral and logical implications this kind of thing ever carries. This is marked by his frequent use of the dismissive phrase “in a foreign land thousands of miles away” to describe whatever situation he is urging us to stay out of. In brief, it isn’t clear how selfishness at the national level should be any more defensible than selfishness as a quality of persons.

Paul has said he does not want to dismantle the global network of military bases, but simply stop making (as many) new ones. Historically speaking, if a dominant military force has a weapon—and bases, among other purposes, are just a complex species of military technology—it tends to use it. Just assuming there is a point to these bases at all, Paul is by no means “anti-interventionist.” And are those “permanent bases” in Iraq the exception, the only ones to be dismantled? Paul hasn’t said so. Will the insurgents stop attacking the bases if we tell them the war is over?; Or are we not to fight them back when attacked? But if we fight back, in what sense will the war have been ended?

None of this need matter, as even regular foreign “interventions” of any scale are perfectly justifiable on straight libertarian principles. Globalization has taken those domestic interests needing of protection from “force or fraud” by the “minimal state,” and flung them across national borders. Not only could most American wars be justified rhetorically as defense of these interests, each was, more or less explicitly, more or less about this in fact. Global capitalism did not emerge without the blunt hammer of military force, nor could it be maintained without it—any more than domestic capital would be safe for five minutes if the threat of protection—i.e., cops, mostly—were removed.

Paul’s resistance to foreign aid rubs against his anti-intervention prejudice. Recalling his fight with Giuliani in the Republican debates, he is quick to note the “blowback” effect whereby a meddling American foreign policy angers its victims to retaliate. But if “just leav[ing]” occupied lands in the Middle East is a necessary condition of remedying this effect, things have gone too far for it to be sufficient. The grievances feeding Islamist anger are widespread in the Muslim world and won’t be satisfied without massive reconstruction and reparations. (This is also required by international law, and human decency.) The dreaded “entanglements” are already in place. A Ron Paul presidency makes reparations unlikely, which makes Islamic terrorism against the U.S. more likely, along with continued “interventions” which in a Paul presidency would be justified for “national self-defense.”

Finally, there is Paul’s racist view, expressed in the debates, that “we don’t understand the irrationality of Middle East politics.” (He attributes this to Reagan, an intervention-aholic who invented the first War on Terror in Central America.) It isn’t clear how, on such a view, Paul could confidently subsitute diplomatic negotiation for force or aid to resolve conflicts in the region. By definition, irrational people can’t be reasoned with. (Further, one might ask, negotiate with what, if not force or aid?)

Capitalism Needs War, and Ron Paul Needs What Capitalism Needs

Finally, as president Ron Paul would do nothing to challenge the free-market policies that make wars inevitable—and even necessary: It is not just that a capitalist “ruling class,” in Marxist terms, desires conflicts to protect its interests; the capitalist system itself requires “interventions” for its smooth functioning.

The story, in simple and short, is two-part:

(a) There is an enormous—and under normal conditions, growing—amount of finance capital in search of investment outlets; capitalist profitability requires that all of this be invested, and the commodities this investment will produce be absorbed by a market at a price covering production costs plus a profit. This is a concern not only of local capitalists but of the nation-state whose health depends on the health of the same domestic economy. But the “home” markets of the big national producers provide neither a means for absorbing these commodities nor sufficient opportunities for investment of the free capital.

Acting as competitors on behalf of local capitals, nation-states seek these conditions abroad: New outlets for capital investment, creating new markets to absorb commodities. And to compensate for the residual that is not invested, or sold, they seek control over raw materials to make production cheaper—just as domestic capitals seek to lower the cost of labor inputs by cutting wages and benefits. However, the world is finite, and so are the opportunities for expansion, while the sums needing investment (ideally) keep growing. Conflicting global interests lead to actual conflict.

(b) Normal consumer goods are a two-fold problem for capitalists: They need, again, to be absorbed in a market, plus they “feed back” into the same productive process they came from as they mentally and physically sustain the workers who consume them to produce another day (and allows them to produce tomorrow’s new workers—their children); this maintains [the growth of] the whole productive “machine” and thus the whole pressure for reinvestment. So one way to offset the pressure for profitability is to find some product which does not need to be absorbed in markets, and which does not “feed back” into the productive process. Heavy arms production, funded through taxes and loans from the state, is one such product. Arms are simply destroyed in use or lay fallow. Of course, these must be employed in the field of battle often enough to justify the state’s expenditure. The arms economy of World War II saved the U.S. from the Great Depression where the New Deal (alone) could not. (War also simply destroys vast amounts of productive capital—factories, crops, etc.—for many local competitors at once, leading to the same effect.)


Latest sign of the apocalypse

Ron Paul on Issues Beside the War

But it isn’t enough that Paul’s “progressive” followers establish his antiwar credentials. It is not enough even that these credentials be measured favorably against his less progressive views (which includes pretty much the rest of his politics). What Paul would do on non-war related matters must be weighed against what he could actually get away with doing—in a net sense, in a lasting way—on the antiwar front.

A President Paul would liquidate or outsource as much of the good and useful parts of government he could get away with—federal protection for abortion, civil rights legislation, labor regulations, campaign finance reforms, environmental legislation, and Social Security. In turn, he’ll secure tons of tax relief for the wealthiest wealthy. He would work to see Roe v. Wade repealed and has introduced bills to end the Occupational Health and Safety Act, the federal minimum wage, the most prominent and longstanding antitrust laws, federal environmental regulations including all federal regulations on fuel production, and all restrictions on individual or business campaign contributions. In 2006 he voted not to renew the Civil Rights Act of 1964 desegregating schools and ending Jim Crow in the South, and he opposes the 1965 Voting Rights Act securing minority access to the polls. (In this vein, Paul even introduced a bill to deny student aid to any student who happens to be Iranian.) (See the voting record here.)

Most of what Presidents “do” has nothing to do with warmaking or peacemaking; and most of what Paul would do as to this majority is glaringly regressive. His record, combined with his meagre antiwar chops, suggest that the damage Paul would do by simply behaving during the presidential phase of his political career as he has behaved in its pre-presidential phase, is not at all clearly better than the best case scenario: A single president, initiating withdrawal from a single (phase of a single) conflict, somewhat earlier than it might have otherwise been initiated; leading to a massive, enduring backlash against “Ron Paulism” by the forces invested in “staying the course.”

Why Progressives Should Not Vote for Ron Paul, Whatever His Antiwar Credentials Look Like: A Sketch

More must be said about these “forces,” as it were, that “govern the governor.” A president, strictly speaking, no more just “makes” policy than those liberal reporters Bill O’Reilley harps upon “make” the news. Ron Paul would be subject to the same hard constraints Ralph Nader (or Karl Marx) would face as president. These constraints explain why those “neocons” Ron Paul says have hijacked our foreign policy haven’t been able to achieve, in eight years of supposed power, even close to their maximal program—attacking Iran and Saudi Arabia and imposing a royal Hashemite dynasty on Iraq. They also explain why historically, in terms of the issue of troop redeployment, a candidate’s word about what he will do is worth precisely nothing in assessing what he will actually do when elected.

These constraints are alternately describable as what Marxists call “material conditions,” or that social “ruling class” of capitalists in the role of responding to these conditions. One of many angles to this basic story is that: A “serious” president—that is, someone for whom the job is not performance art; someone who cares about not running the whole machine into the ground—is concerned about more than one issue, and looks beyond than one “moment” in his political life and the life of his Party. This requires compromise with other politicians and the monied forces that got him (and them) elected. Some of these forces will push for the foreign aid and military assistance which they have always pushed for. In face of these, a strict adherence to “principle” will marginalize Paul and ensure his replacement by someone they can work with. (These “principles” also ensure that Paul will never become President in the first place.)

But if Ron Paul offers no long-term solution to “War,” this still leaves the possibility of voting for Ron Paul as a short-term solution to this particular conflict. I suppose this is what Paul’s “progressive” supporters are up to. But even if he ended the Iraq war, this brings problems of its own, as does support for any “progressive” candidate that does nothing to challenge the (re. capitalist) power base of the major parties.

In short, the whole history of progressive movements shows that those which actually challenge the power base of these parties (and most don’t) have to work outside of them to avoid being co-opted by them (which would ultimately enhance these bases of power and make them harder to tackle the next try around). But successfully working outside of this system requires construction of an alternate social power base or risks being either destroyed by or absorbed back into the dominant one all the same. In this way, working for a progressive candidate (or a progressive movement—like the antiwar movement—which is attached to a candidate) minus the right conditions is always counterproductive in the longer term.

Understanding this dynamic is especially relevant on the eve of an election year and warrants a freestanding post, to arrive in the near.